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Introduction
Disasters can come from unforeseeable sources and create unforeseeable problems. The 
nation’s response system is built to be flexible and responsive to all threats, including those 
we cannot predict. As a result, federal, state, and local governments adopted the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS), a framework developed by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, for responding to all forms of emergencies, including terrorist attacks,1 
natural disasters,2 oil spills,3 and emerging infectious diseases.4 NIMS’s defining 
characteristics—a clear chain of command and flexible organizational structure—allow it to 
adapt to any situation.5
While NIMS creates a clear structure for emergency response, state and local responders 
must still operate within their respective jurisdiction’s legal system. The law establishes both 
the powers and limitations for how government officials protect citizens’ health and well-
being.6 While many laws have been drafted specifically for the benefit of responding to 
disasters,7 complex and inflexible legal structures might impede efficient and effective 
responses.8 To minimize this impact, streamlined and flexible legal systems are vital to 
address the unforeseeable circumstances that disasters create.9 Centralized emergency 
response authorities and emergency declarations can act more efficiently than separate 
groups of officials and various types of emergency declarations.10 Further, an adaptable legal 
system requires the ability to remove legal barriers. A streamlined and adaptable emergency 
response legal system allows disaster responders to react as quickly and efficiently as 
possible in our world of ever-changing threats.11
This Article makes the case for streamlining emergency declaration authority and creating 
an adaptable legal system. Part I describes the utility of emergency declarations, but gives 
examples of how that utility can be diminished when states divide specific emergency 
powers across various types of declarations.12 Part II explores gubernatorial emergency 
powers to suspend or waive laws as an adaptable solution for removing legal barriers to an 
efficient and effective emergency response.13 These arguments demonstrate that a 
streamlined and adaptable state legal system for emergency response is one that (1) provides 
a governor with the authority to issue one type of emergency declaration, (2) does not divide 
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vital authorities across various declaration types, and (3) provides a governor with the 
unilateral power to remove statutory and regulatory barriers to an effective response.
I. Streamlined Emergency Declarations are Necessary to Activate 
Alternative Legal Procedures
Emergency powers are a fundamental tool in legal preparedness.14 However, legal 
mechanisms for activating these powers through emergency declarations can be complex,15 
situation dependent,16 and divided among specific executive officials.17 Leadership turnover 
can also exacerbate confusion by creating knowledge gaps about which officials can exercise 
what authorities in which situations.18 While emergency declaration powers provide a 
foundation for emergency response, a disparate system of state emergency declaration 
powers can create a gap in legal preparedness.
Emergency declarations provide government responders with vital tools to address the 
threats posed by disasters. State emergency declaration powers exist thanks to policymakers 
determining that—to respond to large-scale threats to the health and well-being of citizens—
governors need special authorities for the purposes of mitigating the effects of such threats.
19 These “all-hazards” declarations—referred to by a variety of names, including “state of 
emergency,”20 “disaster,”21 or “emergency,”22—trigger powers that can be used to activate 
state emergency plans,23 activate the state’s national guard,24 and authorize the use of broad 
powers, including the power to commandeer property and supplies for government use.25 
All-hazards declarations can be contrasted with “public health emergencies” and “multi-
level declarations.” Public health emergency declarations are specific emergency 
declarations that are limited to certain types of threats, such as diseases; multi-level 
declarations are based on the intensity of the threat or level of destruction.26 Public health 
emergency and multi-level declarations can create complexity for an emergency response 
system by imbuing officials other than the governor— such as state health officials—with 
the power to declare emergencies and by limiting certain governmental powers—which may 
be necessary during all disasters—to specific types of disasters.27 The creation of disparate 
emergency declaration types creates an unnecessary legal complexity that could burden 
disaster planners and responders and hinder rapid and effective emergency response.
Florida’s recent response to the Zika virus outbreak demonstrated both the utility of 
emergency declaration authorities and the complexity created by disparate types of 
emergency declarations. Florida’s first cases of travel-related Zika virus infection were 
announced on January 19, 2016.28 On February 3, Florida Governor Rick Scott issued an 
emergency declaration to address the threat of Zika in the state.29 In the declaration, 
Governor Scott ordered a number of emergency response actions, including designating the 
state health department as the agency in charge of coordinating the response, instructing all 
state agencies under the governor’s direction to cooperate with the state health department, 
and requesting that agencies not under the governor’s direction do the same.30 Additionally, 
the governor ordered the state’s Department of Environmental Protection and its Fish and 
Wildlife Conservation Commission to “support the Department of Agriculture and 
Consumer Services in any way as it develops extensive mosquito control plans to contain the 
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spread of [Zika].”31 By using these authorities, the governor established a clear chain of 
command for interagency cooperation.
The governor issued another Zika emergency declaration four months later on June 23.32 
The new declaration greatly expanded the list of affected counties covered by the initial 
emergency declaration and activated additional vital emergency powers related to funding 
the response activities.33 One such power, codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.37(2), states 
that:
If the Governor finds that the demands placed upon [emergency management] 
funds in coping with a particular disaster declared by the Governor as a state of 
emergency are unreasonably great, she or he may make funds available by 
transferring and expending moneys appropriated for other purposes, by transferring 
and expending moneys out of any unappropriated surplus funds, or from the Budget 
Stabilization Fund.34
By activating this authority, the Governor diverted $26.2 million in state funds to the 
response efforts.35 As of October 2016, shortly after Congress passed the Zika Response and 
Preparedness Act,36 at least $73.2 million in state funds had been diverted to Florida’s 
efforts to combat Zika.37 This allocation relied entirely on the Governor’s use of emergency 
declarations as a vital legal mechanism to combat the threat that was facing the state.
At the same time, Florida’s use of emergency response authorities in the fight against Zika 
demonstrated how disjointed executive authorities can complicate an emergency response. 
Like other states that have emergency declaration authorities unique to certain threats,38 
Florida allows specific authorities to be invoked only during a declared public health 
emergency. Florida defines a public health emergency as “any occurrence, or threat thereof, 
whether natural or manmade, which results or may result in substantial injury or harm to the 
public health from infectious disease, chemical agents, nuclear agents, biological toxins, or 
situations involving mass casualties or natural disasters.”39 The only party that may declare 
a public health emergency is the State Health Officer, who must consult with the governor if 
possible before doing so.40 Without a public health emergency declaration from the State 
Health Officer, officials cannot use unique emergency response authorities, including issuing 
orders to allocate prescription drugs to certain geographic areas, temporarily reactivating 
certain healthcare practitioners’ licenses, or ordering individuals to be examined, tested, 
vaccinated, treated, isolated, or quarantined.41
Florida’s two-declaration approach required Governor Scott, in his February and June 2016 
emergency declarations, to “direct the State Health Officer and Surgeon General, Dr. John 
Armstrong, to declare a public health emergency” in the affected counties.42 Complying 
with this order, Dr. Armstrong issued a public health emergency declaration, ordering a 
meeting of representatives from various county agencies and boards for affected counties, 
the development of action plans by each county health officer to be submitted to state health 
department’s incident command offices, and the development of “an outreach program for 
local medical professionals to increase awareness and access to diagnostic tools.”43 As Zika 
spread, Dr. Armstrong issued an additional public health emergency declaration extending 
the same requirements to newly affected counties.44 Media outlets widely misreported Dr. 
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Armstrong’s declaration as a public health emergency declaration by the Governor, thus 
demonstrating the confusion that having two unique types of declarations can create.45 
Although Florida’s response to Zika did not require issuance of quarantine orders or 
reactivation of healthcare professionals’ licenses, had those actions been necessary, media 
reports likely would have indicated that those public health emergency-specific authorities 
had been activated and ready for use when that was not, in fact, the case.
The challenges that this kind of system poses go beyond semantics. A jurisdiction can be 
best prepared by integrating legal authorities seamlessly into plans, exercises, and 
procedures. This integration must clearly and comprehensively describe when and how those 
powers may be used. Consider a state whose emergency plan has processes to reactivate 
healthcare licenses— including those of retired healthcare professionals—during an 
emergency, and included those reactivations in its exercises. That state would train its 
leaders and medical community to consider a public health emergency as a trigger for 
licensure reactivation. If response leaders then heard in a real-world event— either through 
the media or by word of mouth—that the governor had declared a public health emergency, 
they would, at best, have to clarify whether the licensure reactivation power had been 
activated. At worst, they could assume that they may begin contacting retired healthcare 
practitioners.
Disparate emergency declarations can also obfuscate legally mandated protections for 
emergency responders and healthcare providers participating in response activities. For 
example, following Hurricane Katrina, many in the field of emergency response law called 
for increasing liability protections for healthcare providers who participate in emergency 
response activities.46 They argued that healthcare providers are more willing to serve in 
dangerous and distressing situations when they are protected from liability.47 Maryland 
began providing these liability protections by passing the Catastrophic Health Emergencies 
Act in 2011.48 Under the law, healthcare provider liability protections are provided only 
upon the declaration of a “catastrophic health emergency.”49 However, the Act conditions 
the declaration of a catastrophic health emergency on a proclamation by the governor that “a 
situation in which extensive loss of life or serious disability is threatened imminently 
because of exposure to a deadly agent.”50 Unlike Florida, which includes natural disasters in 
its definition of public health emergency, Maryland law defines a deadly agent only as:
1. Anthrax, ebola, plague, smallpox, tularemia, or other bacterial, fungal, 
rickettsial, or viral agent, biological toxin, or other biological agent capable of 
causing extensive loss of life or serious disability;
2. Mustard gas, nerve gas, or other chemical agent capable of causing extensive loss 
of life or serious disability; or
3. Radiation at levels capable of causing extensive loss of life or serious disability.
51
In the case of a natural disaster—such as a blizzard or hurricane—the governor would have 
to declare a “state of emergency” and activate a different set of emergency powers.52 Since 
Maryland’s liability protection statute for healthcare providers during disasters states that 
providers are “immune from civil or criminal liability if the health care provider acts in good 
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faith and under a catastrophic health emergency proclamation,”53 such protections would not 
apply during a state of emergency declared by the governor.54
Maryland’s volunteer healthcare provider disaster liability protections stand in contrast to 
Virginia’s liability protections. Under Virginia law, a healthcare provider is protected from 
liability during a state of emergency:
[A]ny healthcare provider who responds to a disaster shall not be liable for any 
injury or wrongful death of any person arising from the delivery … of healthcare 
when (i) a state or local emergency has been … declared in response to such 
disaster, and (ii) the emergency and subsequent conditions caused a lack of 
resources, attributable to the disaster, rendering the healthcare provider unable to 
provide the level or manner of care that otherwise would have been required in the 
absence of the emergency and which resulted in the injury or wrongful death at 
issue.55
This protection applies in any type of disaster, including weather-related, biological, and 
man-made threats.56 Due to these different types of declarations that activate disaster 
liability protections in Virginia and Maryland, if a hurricane traveled up the Chesapeake 
Bay, caused Hurricane Katrina level destruction, and both Virginia and Maryland declared 
emergencies, only healthcare providers in Virginia would receive disaster liability 
protections, as a hurricane would not qualify as a “deadly agent” under Maryland law. This 
could cause confusion and a subsequent refusal by healthcare responders to volunteer to 
assist in response activities in Maryland.
Variations in disaster types are not just limited to states dividing natural disasters from 
disease-related emergencies, but also include states creating multiple levels of a broadly 
defined state of emergency. For example, Tennessee law defines three types of disasters: 
“catastrophic disaster,” “major disaster,” and “minor disaster.”57 A catastrophic disaster is “a 
disaster that will require massive state and federal assistance, including immediate military 
involvement.”58 A major disaster is “a disaster that will likely exceed local capabilities and 
require a broad range of state and federal assistance.”59 A minor disaster is one that “is 
likely to be within the response capabilities of local government and to result in only a 
minimal need for state or federal assistance.”60
These unique disaster types in Tennessee correspond with unique authorities. For example, 
volunteer healthcare providers, including hospitals and community mental healthcare 
centers, can only receive liability protections during a catastrophic or major disaster.61 The 
law does not provide liability protections during declared minor disasters. In states with laws 
like Tennessee’s, responders do not only need to parse out which powers align with disease-
related versus weather-related emergencies—but they might also need to determine which 
authorities align with different levels of destruction.
Qualifying liability protections by type of emergency can confuse responders and dissuade 
them from helping when and where they are needed most.62 When emergency response 
teams are short staffed, affected communities take longer to recover. In 2016, the National 
Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) released a report that analyzed 
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survey responses from 2,533 local health authorities.63 Of those, only 44% reported to 
NACCHO that they had reviewed legal authorities relevant to emergency preparedness and 
response.64 Presumably, those jurisdictions can expect specific emergency declarations to 
activate specific response authorities, and might have built those triggers into plans and 
exercises. Yet, even in such jurisdictions, confusion regarding which powers correspond with 
which declaration could still occur. For the 56% of local health departments that did not 
report having reviewed legal authorities for response, the problems that ensue could be even 
worse. Health authorities can minimize this kind of confusion by streamlining emergency 
declarations for all hazard types and allowing only one entity to declare a state of 
emergency.
The emergency declaration authorities discussed in this Part serve as a vital first step in 
activating emergency powers and procedures to aid in disaster response. In theory, the utility 
of emergency declarations may extend to many specific areas of law, such as scopes of 
practice, procurement, and the collection and use of individuals’ health data. In reality, the 
legal barriers to an effective response may only become apparent once a disaster has struck, 
making it difficult to anticipate exactly how a declaration should be utilized. The following 
Part will discuss a solution many—but not all—states have developed to address this 
challenge: granting state governors the broad authority to remove legal barriers to an 
emergency response.
II. Gubernatorial Emergency Suspension Authorities are Necessary for an 
Adequately Flexible Legal System to Mitigate the Effects of Unforeseeable 
Threats and Their Impact
One of the greatest tools to ensure legal systems can adapt in disaster situations is the 
authority to suspend or waive legal requirements. Laws are the “structures, norms, and rules 
that a society uses to resolve disputes, govern itself, and order relations between members of 
the society.”65 Laws and legal authorities “proscribe practices thought to threaten health and 
prescribe practices thought to compliment it.”66 But because disasters stress existing 
systems and resources, day-to-day legal requirements could hinder communities facing 
disasters rather than help them.67 Consequently, some laws include language that waives 
certain requirements during declared emergencies that are specific to the authorities 
governed only by those specific laws.68 While these authority-specific waivers and 
suspensions are useful, they do not provide the flexibility necessary to address unforeseen 
circumstances; such flexibility is only provided by broad emergency suspension powers.
The utility and limitations of authority-specific waivers and suspensions are demonstrated at 
both the federal and state levels. For example, Section 1135 of the Social Security Act 
authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to suspend requirements 
under Medicare, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act, and the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act 
upon a presidential emergency declaration and a public health emergency determination by 
the Secretary of HHS.69 More recently, the 21st Century Cures Act of 201670 allows the 
Secretary of HHS to waive requirements— established by the Paperwork Reduction Act 
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(PRA)—regarding the federal government’s collection of voluntary information after (1) 
declaring a public health emergency under the Public Health Service Act and (2) 
determining that the emergency necessitates a waiver of the PRA.71 However, this waiver 
was added only after the federal government was forced to meet the PRA requirements 
during responses to recent disease outbreaks.72
States have used the same methods to add flexibility to their legal systems through statute- 
or regulation-specific waivers and suspensions. One domain in which states have provided 
authority-specific flexibility in declared emergencies is in the context of vaccination 
authorities.73 Laws governing the administration of vaccines by pharmacists can be complex 
and full of conditions.74 As of 2016, every state and the District of Columbia has granted 
pharmacists some form of authority to vaccinate individuals.75 However, pharmacists’ 
authority to vaccinate can come with many limitations, including limits on the ages of 
individuals who can receive a vaccination,76 the types of vaccinations that may be 
administered, how those vaccines may be administered,77 and requirements for third-party 
authorization.78 Some of the most complex limitations mandate the age at which one can 
receive certain vaccines from a pharmacist.79 These complexities can create major barriers 
to achieving herd immunity in a pandemic, especially as new vaccines are developed or as 
“changes in recommendations for existing vaccines (e.g., expanded populations, changes in 
dosing) … make it difficult for state policy makers to keep pace.”80
Still, few states specifically exempt limitations on pharmacist vaccination authorities during 
formal emergency declarations. Prior to 2002, no states had such exceptions.81 That year, 
New Mexico was the first to modify its pharmacist vaccination laws to include specific 
exceptions for disasters; Virginia followed in 2003.82 As of 2015, of the forty-seven states 
that grant pharmacists express authority to vaccinate,83 only ten states explicitly provided 
exceptions in their pharmacist vaccination laws for state-declared emergencies.84 In the 
remaining jurisdictions, responders must find alternative legal mechanisms that allow for 
exceptions to pharmacist vaccination authorities, or must seek out other types of healthcare 
professionals to administer vaccines.
Unfortunately, relying on authority-specific waivers is only part of the solution. Used alone, 
authority-specific waivers require lawmakers to either anticipate how a disaster response 
might impact all authorities and build relevant provisions into law, or else add the waiver to 
the law after an emergency occurs (as was the case with the PRA waiver).85 States must 
implement far more flexible solutions to deal with unforeseen threats.
The most adaptable method by far is allowing governors to suspend any statutes or 
regulations that inhibit response upon the declaration of an emergency. This tool has proved 
exceptionally useful. The 2015 HIV outbreak in Scott County, Indiana, demonstrated the 
efficiency of gubernatorial emergency suspension authorities as a means to remove legal 
barriers while legislative solutions are being pursued.
The HIV outbreak began with eleven confirmed cases in January; typically, the county saw 
fewer than five cases per year.86 After an investigation, officials concluded that the cases 
“were linked to syringe-sharing partners injecting the prescription opioid oxymorphone.”87 
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The county deployed a multifaceted response to prevent additional cases from spreading 
through shared needles.88 This included “a public education campaign, establishment of an 
incident command center and a community outreach center, short-term authorization of 
syringe exchange, and support for comprehensive medical care, including HIV and hepatitis 
C virus care and treatment as well as substance abuse counseling and treatment.”89 However, 
Indiana law prohibited the operation of needle exchanges at the time; violating the 
prohibition was punishable by criminal and civil penalties.90 To remove this legal barrier, 
then-Governor Mike Pence declared an emergency on March 26, 2015.91 By activating 
response authorities, the Governor gained the power to “[s]uspend the provisions of any 
regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of state business, or the orders, 
rules, or regulations of any state agency if strict compliance with any of these provisions 
would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the 
emergency.”92 This enabled the Governor to suspend all statutes that would inhibit the 
operation of a needle exchange program to address the Scott County HIV epidemic, 
including any associated civil and criminal penalties.93 The suspension authority allowed 
responders to act immediately.94 In the meantime, the Indiana state legislature spent time 
crafting a longer-term solution to allow counties to establish needle-exchange programs.95 
Absent the governor’s agile emergency suspension authority, responders would have been 
forced to wait until the state legislature was able to convene and act to remove the legal 
barrier to an effective response.
A gubernatorial emergency suspension authority lets states remove legal barriers quickly and 
effectively to aid a response effort. However, this power is not available in all states and not 
for all types of legal barriers. In a recent study, researchers from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention’s Public Health Law Program and the National Nurse-Led Care 
Consortium: Public Health Management Corporation analyzed the laws of the fifty states 
and the District of Columbia, to determine which jurisdictions authorize governors to 
broadly amend or suspend laws under a state-declared emergency.96 Researchers found that 
forty-two state governors possess the authority to suspend either statutes or regulations 
during a disaster.97 While forty-two of fifty-one jurisdictions might appear to be a near 
uniform adoption of this authority by states, upon closer examination, the data show that this 
authority extends to statutory requirements in only thirty-five of the states.98 Yet, both 
regulations and statutes outline how the government should respond to emergencies. With 
that in mind, fifteen states and the District of Columbia cannot, under express authority, look 
to their government’s chief executive to remove statutory barriers to effectuate an efficient 
response.99 Those jurisdictions would either need to respond in a way that complied with 
existing laws or seek other means to removing legal barriers.100 Gubernatorial emergency 
declaration authorities that allow for the suspension of statutes and regulations provide 
response leaders with a streamlined tool that is adaptable to all manner of unforeseen threats.
Conclusion
Threats can take many forms. Some are predictable, but many are not. The U.S. emergency 
response system has rightfully adopted an all-hazards approach to dealing with threats. This 
approach requires uniform systems of response leadership. The adoption of NIMS as the de 
facto organizational structure for all types of threats, including natural disasters, oil spills, 
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and disease emergencies, evinces this approach’s strength. NIMS is characterized by a clear 
chain of command and a flexible organizational structure.101 Our legal emergency response 
system must possess these traits, too. To that end, emergency response authorities should be 
centralized—not dispersed among groups of officials and various types of emergency 
declarations. Further, an adaptable legal system must be able to remove legal barriers, both 
seen and unforeseen. While legislatures and executive branch officials have anticipated some 
legal issues and built emergency waivers into legislation, an agile legal system allows 
governors to suspend both statutes and regulations for the period necessitated by a disaster. 
With a streamlined and adaptable emergency response system that does not divide vital 
authorities across various declaration types and provides a unilateral power to remove 
statutory and regulatory barriers to effective responses, disaster responders can ensure as 
quick and efficient a response as possible in a world of ever-changing threats.
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